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Abstract: This article investigates the economic nature and characteristics of digital 
goods. Such goods are, due to their replicability, shown to be public goods (albeit in an 
evolutionary way) and durable goods. Furthermore, the content of such goods, combined 
with their durability, makes them experience goods. While only one of these 
characteristics would be sufficient to create difficulties for producers and lead to market 
failure, this article demonstrates that each of the characteristics reinforces the other. The 
framework presented in the article is then applied to two important issues: the new trend 
of massive consumer piracy and the overall problem of value of digital goods. 
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he last decade has seen the advent and growth of two strongly linked 
phenomena which have led to important changes in the worldwide 
economy. The first is the development of the digital economy, based on 
the digitalisation of previously existing goods and on the development of new 
purely digital goods. This technology has not only permitted the creation of 
many new goods or services, but has also dramatically changed the way an 
entire category of goods in the economy are created, produced, distributed, 
exchanged and consumed. Digital technology has caused a drastic 
decrease in reproduction costs and distribution costs (and even, sometimes, 
in initial production costs), thereby leading to important structural changes in 
the economy and potentially a global rise of social welfare, due to the 
increase in quantity, quality and variety of goods and services available in 
the economy. While originally restricted to a few types of good (software, 
mostly), the scope of use of digital technology has progressively increased 
to encompass many kinds of goods: music, films, photos, books, etc.  
The second phenomenon, which has followed the same increasing trend 
as the first, is the development and generalisation of consumer piracy. 
Although consumer piracy has always existed and had already become an 
important issue since the release of early consumer-oriented duplicating 
technologies, the piracy phenomenon has never been as strong as it is 
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nowadays. Furthermore, none of the many attempts (legal and/or 
technological) of firms and governments has been able to curb piracy. The 
link between these two phenomena is clear, since, nowadays, consumer 
piracy is almost entirely related to digital goods. In fact, the benefits created 
by digital technology, in terms of distribution and reproduction costs, have 
been brought to the economy as a whole, thereby allowing the consumers to 
reproduce, distribute and exchange digital goods (virtually) without  incurring 
any cost. The overall effect on the economy of digital technology is, thus, 
ambiguous. On the one hand, it has enabled a strong potential growth. On 
the other hand, consumer piracy endangers firms, since it undermines their 
ability to recover initial investment. In fact, beyond the sole problem of 
consumer piracy, digital technology has greatly affected the way companies 
do business. While some traditional business models have revealed 
themselves as unsuitable (e.g. paid directory services), firms have had to 
find new ways to appropriate returns on investment and have increasingly 
relied on personalisation and indirect funding (e.g. advertisement) 
(SHAPIRO & VARIAN, 1999). 
The thesis developed in this article is that the challenges brought by the 
advent of the digital economy can be more easily apprehended once the 
economic nature of digital products has been examined. While it has often 
(wrongly) been said that traditional economics do not work within the context 
of the digital economy and that ‘new economics' are needed, this article 
aims to demonstrate, that, on the contrary, sound economic concepts can be 
used to explain and comprehend the challenges brought about by digital 
technology. The arguments developed in the article aim to demonstrate that, 
because of their digital nature, digital goods are fully replicable (can be 
copied without loss of quality or information). This results in the following 
fundamental economic characteristics: digital goods are public (1
st Section) 
and durable (2
nd Section). These two characteristics are important, since 
they are known, in the literature, for the loss of market power they induce for 
the firms that produce such goods and for the market failure they may entail.  
In addition to these two fundamental characteristics of digital goods, 
which exist regardless of the content of the goods, this article considers a 
third feature. The content of a digital good may be such that its actual value 
can only be fully realised once the good has been consumed. Thus, in 
addition to being public and durable, some digital goods are also experience 
goods (3
rd Section). In this respect, it is important to note that, while not a 
defining characteristic feature of digital goods, many digital goods are, due 
to the nature of their content (music, films, books, etc.), experience goods. T. RAYNA  15 
Figure 1 - The economic nature of digital goods:  
how technology, characteristics and behaviour interact 
Some of these characteristics have been recently discussed in the 
literature. VARIAN (1998) and SHAPIRO & VARIAN (1999) discuss the 
consequences of information goods being experience goods. Furthermore, 
VARIAN (1998) discusses the public aspect of information goods. SHAPIRO 
& VARIAN (1999) also, briefly, mention the durability of information goods. 
However, these works are devoted to the study of information goods and, 
while digital goods are information goods (since they are composed of a 
stream of 0s and 1s) not all information goods are digital goods. The scope 
of these works is, thus, broader and less specific than the one of this article. 
Furthermore, a large emphasis in SHAPIRO & VARIAN (1999) is put on the 
strategies firms can develop to remain successful in the information 
economy and the economic nature and characteristics are mentioned solely 
as a support of these arguments. QUAH (2003) analyses in detail the public 
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provision of such goods. The novelty of the analysis presented in this article 
lies in its acknowledgement that the three important economic 
characteristics of digital goods have, not only similar roots, but also interact 
with each other. Instead of studying each element separately, a combined 
analysis of these three main features of digital goods is conducted in order 
to fully comprehend the challenges raised by digital goods for both firms and 
policy makers.
After introducing each of the characteristics (1
st to 3
rd Sections), the 4
th
one revisits the issue of consumer piracy in the light of the analysis 
conducted in the previous sections. Finally, we investigate how the three 
characteristics interact and how this interaction affects the value of digital 
goods. 
  Digital goods are public goods 
Public goods  1 are defined as goods that are both non-rival in 
consumption and non-excludable (SAMUELSON, 1954; BUCHANAN, 
1965) 2. A good is non-rival in consumption if the consumption activity of 
each consumer does not decrease the quantity of good available in the 
economy. A good is non-excludable if no one can be prevented from 
consuming it. Public goods hold a particular place in the economic literature. 
The first reason for that is that, until recently, such goods were considered 
as extremely rare, so rare, in fact, that they were little more than a curiosity. 
Besides goods such as street lighting, lighthouse and nuclear deterrence, all 
goods in the economy display at least some degree of rivalness and/or 
excludability. The second reason is that public goods are the only cause of 
market failure that cannot be corrected by appropriate market mechanisms 
and, therefore, require public intervention to be produced at a socially 
satisfactory level. 
Indeed, the non-excludability property of public goods leads consumers 
to adopt a free-riding behaviour (SAMUELSON, 1954; BUCHANAN, 1965), 
1 The economic literature distinguishes between the nature (private/public) of a good and the 
way (privately/publicly) it is provided. The fact that a good is provided privately does not mean 
that it is not, by nature, public. Likewise, most goods provided publicly (education, health) are, 
by nature, private. 
2 Public goods are, thus, the exact opposite to private goods, which are both rival in 
consumption and excludable. T. RAYNA  17 
as they are able to enjoy the good even if they do not contribute to its 
provision. Thus, they do not have any reason to pay for the good or, when 
the provision is organised through a governmental action, to reveal their 
actual valuation of the good. Moreover, this free-riding behaviour is rational, 
as it maximises the individual utility and economic agents are expected to be 
guided solely by their private interest (BUCHANAN, 1965). 
If everybody adopts such (rational) behaviour, the public good cannot be 
produced because nobody contributes to its provision. However, since 
individuals actually do value the public good, and everybody would be better 
off if the public good were, in fact, produced, the private provision of a public 
good is sub-optimal and leads to market failure. Governments have, thus, to 
intervene so that the public good can be produced. However, in addition to 
the potential bias introduced by public intervention, the quantity of public 
good produced is arbitrary and has no reason to be efficient, as 
governments do not have the power to make consumers reveal their 
valuation (because it would translate into an equivalent amount of tax being 
paid). The fact that digital goods are public goods bears important 
consequences. The considerably large number of these goods in the 
economy, as well as their ever growing importance, greatly affects the 
traditional balance between public goods and private goods in the economy. 
It also makes market failure more likely to arise and, thereby, leads to an 
increased public intervention. However, understanding the public nature of 
digital goods is essential to comprehend one of the biggest challenges of the 
digital economy: consumer piracy.  
The rivalness of digital goods 
It is important to note that digital goods may seem, at first, rival in 
consumption: if a CD is used by a consumer, this particular CD is no longer 
available for the consumption of other consumers and the consumption 
activity of one consumer, indeed, reduces the number of units available for 
other consumers. However, there is rivalness only as far as the medium 
used to distribute the digital good (floppy disc, CD, DVD, etc.) is concerned, 
and not the digital good itself. The medium is indeed unique: if a consumer is 
using it, then the plastic component referred to as "CD" cannot be used at 
the same time by another consumer. The digital good itself (i.e. the binary 
code of the software, music file, etc.) can be replicated on another medium 
for a small (often negligible, cost). While rivalness exists if a consumer 
borrows a CD from another consumer, it is not present if the digital good is 18     No. 71, 3
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copied instead, as both consumers can enjoy the same unit of good at the 
same time. Since digital goods can be copied without any loss of quality or 
information and are, in general, independent from the medium used to 
distribute them (the good matters, not the medium), they can be considered 
as non-rival. In fact, creating a copy can be seen as part of the consumption 
process (this is definitely the case with digital goods distributed online, 
legally or not, when they are downloaded), thus the consumption activity of 
one consumer does not decrease the potential consumption of other 
consumers. This is, by definition, the case when goods are non-rival. 
The excludability of digital goods 
The main difference between digital goods and the other traditional public 
goods is that the producers of digital goods always retain the ability to 
directly exclude consumers. While nobody can be prevented from 
consuming a lighthouse once it has been produced, a producer of a digital 
good is still able to prevent its direct customers from consuming the good 
(regardless of the number of pirated copies available, an online merchant is 
always able to prevent people from downloading digital goods from his 
website if they did not pay). However, since digital goods can be replicated, 
anybody owning a digital good is a potential supplier of this good. Thus, 
once the first unit of the good has been sold, the producer starts losing 
control over the production of the good and part of its power to exclude 
consumers. As the producer does not have the ability to exclude consumers 
indirectly, the more the good spreads among consumers, the less it is 
possible for the producer to actually exclude anybody from the consumption 
of the good. 
Thus, as for any public good, only the first unit of a digital good produced 
is actually excludable, since as long as nobody else owns the digital good, 
the producer remains the sole supplier of that good. In contrast to other 
public goods, though, the next units sold remain partially excludable. This is 
due to the fact that digital goods are not infinitely expansible: in order to 
avoid getting the good through the producer, the consumer needs to know 
another consumer who owns a copy of the digital good. Because of 
technological limitations, the diffusion of the digital good into the population 
does not occur instantly. However, as the number of consumers owning the 
good grows, the number of potential suppliers increases and the number of 
consumers able to obtain the good from other consumers instead of the 
producer rises. The rate of consumers in a position to supply the good is T. RAYNA  19 
likely to grow exponentially with time, up to the point where every consumer 
can potentially obtain the good without having to purchase it from the 
producer. Therefore, the excludability of the digital good, which remains 
actual for the first units produced, decreases rapidly until the good becomes 
(virtually) non-excludable. Although the producer always remains able to 
directly exclude consumers from the consumption of the good, his inability to 
exclude consumers indirectly is such that the digital goods become de facto
non-excludable when the number of consumers owning the good becomes 
large.
Another difference between digital goods and other public goods comes 
from the fact that non-excludability, which is intrinsic for other public goods, 
directly results from the non-rivalness of digital goods. Indeed, for a digital 
good to be non-excludable, consumers should be able to obtain the good 
from other consumers. For this to happen, digital goods have to be non-rival: 
no consumer would let other consumers copy from him if this action would 
deprive him from the usage of the good. Thus, if digital goods were rival, 
they would also be excludable. This is a particular feature of digital goods, 
since other goods, such as common pool resources (e.g. pasture, clean 
water), are, at the same time, rival and non-excludable.  
Private provision of digital goods 
Understanding the public nature of digital goods enables to make sense 
of the massive scale of consumer piracy associated with these goods. Since 
digital goods are public goods, piracy can be considered as a rational 
behaviour: pirating digital goods is, in fact, free-riding. Leaving aside 
questions of ethics and morals, this fact is important because it means that 
consumers cannot be blamed for adopting such behaviour, since it is the 
individual rational behaviour in presence of a public good. Therefore, the 
problem of piracy is not caused by consumers, but is instead due to the 
nature of digital goods itself: if these goods were private, the piracy 
phenomenon would not exist. This certainly helps to explain the extent of 
"stolen" digital goods in comparison to the small number of other goods that 
are stolen: digital goods are subject, due to their publicness, to free-riding, 
whereas private goods are not. 
However, despite the high level of piracy, many digital goods are 
produced and a large number of companies producing these goods are still 
able to obtain some profits. In the light of the theoretical prediction that 20     No. 71, 3
rd Q. 2008 
public goods cannot be provided privately, this could be, somewhat, 
puzzling. Several reasons can be given to explain this difference between 
theory and practice. 
The first reason is that, even for a traditional public good, consumers are 
more likely to weakly free-ride (i.e. they contribute to the provision of the 
public good, albeit insufficiently for an efficient provision) than totally free 
ride (BRUBAKER, 1975). This phenomenon has been confirmed 
experimentally (ISAAC et al., 1985; ANDREONI, 1988; WEIMANN, 1994) 
and empirically (HAAN & KOOREMAN, 2002). Consequently, although 
consumers do not pay for all the digital goods they consume, they might still 
be inclined to pay for some of them. 
A second reason was already discussed above. Since digital goods are 
not infinitely expansible, they remain excludable for a short period of time. 
Consumers who are not willing to wait have, thus, no choice but to pay. 
Furthermore, even when the publicness of a digital good is total, pirating a 
digital good usually involves costs (reproduction cost, learning and search 
costs). Since these costs are likely to vary greatly from one consumer to 
another, it is not always, and for everybody, worthwhile to pirate, as opposed 
to purchasing digital goods (RAYNA, 2006b). 
Furthermore, the actions of the producers of digital goods are also likely 
to induce additional costs for pirates. Technologies, such as Digital Right 
Management Systems, may have an adverse effect on consumers willing to 
pirate (RAYNA, 2006b).
Once all these reasons have been accounted for, it is then possible to 
envisage another defining feature of digital goods. While other goods are 
either private or public (or have a mixed, but fixed, status, such as club 
goods or common pool resources), the publicness of digital goods is not 
constant and evolves according to factors such as technology, consumer 
behaviour, firm strategies, government policies. However, regardless of the 
obstacles, digital goods all become, eventually, public. Digital goods are, 
thus, evolutionary public. Government interventions, through laws and law 
enforcement, also play an important role in the degree of publicness of 
digital goods. In countries that either do not have intellectual property rights, 
or have such property rights but do not enforce them, digital goods are 
(virtually) fully public. In contrast, strong IPR laws that are strictly enforced 
tend to decrease the publicness of digital goods.  T. RAYNA  21 
However, while the effectiveness of IPRs to deter counterfeiting goods is 
commonly admitted, their ability to impede consumer piracy is more than 
questionable. Due to the inability to monitor all consumer activities, IPRs 
can, at best, target public exchange of digital goods (e.g. exchanges taking 
place on the internet via public servers), which is only the tip of the piracy 
iceberg. Furthermore, it is important to note that such laws only temporarily 
alter the level of publicness of digital goods and do not affect their intrinsic 
public nature. In this respect, QUAH (2003) points out that:  
"Excludability [...] can arise from the law or from technology or from 
both, but it is not itself intrinsic to digital goods." (p. 13).
To this date, none of the technologies or laws developed to prevent 
piracy has been anything but marginally effective, and it is quite likely that it 
will remain so (RAYNA & STRIUKOVA, 2008). Moreover, recent 
technological progress has always resulted in lowering the costs of piracy, 
while, at the same time, many consumers have become used to operating 
pirate software and networks. Consequently, it is quite unlikely that the 
piracy phenomenon will scale down in the future. The increasing supply of 
digital goods in the economy, over the past few years, has certainly been the 
fact that has hidden one of the most important aspects of the economic 
nature of digital goods: their publicness. Although the evolutionary aspect of 
this publicness has left enough room for goods to be produced (and profit to 
be made), it is likely that the quantity and variety of goods produced is sub-
optimal and, thus, leads to a lower social welfare. For this reason and, 
because of the constantly broadening consumer piracy, there have been 
increasingly frequent public interventions with regard to public goods. In this 
respect, understanding the public nature of digital goods is a key element in 
designing efficient public policies.  
  Digital goods are durable goods 
From durable to infinitely durable 
The media used to store digital goods are durable but not infinitely 
durable. While the life expectancy of optical media (such as CDs and DVDs) 
ranges from a few years up to several decades, the durability of magnetic 
equipment (such as floppy discs, hard-drive and tapes) does not exceed a 
few years. Moreover, these media are prone to early failure, because of 22     No. 71, 3
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manufacturing defaults, and can be damaged during usage. In this respect, 
the media used to store digital goods are thus not significantly more durable 
that the material out of which non-digital cultural and information goods (vinyl 
disks, audio tapes, books, etc.) are made. Yet, in contrast to other 
information goods, digital goods can be replicated, and the available 
technology is such that the cost of replicating is nearly null. Therefore, 
although the medium used to store and distribute a digital good is finitely 
durable, the digital good itself is potentially infinitely durable, provided that it 
is transferred onto a new medium before the current one fails. Although most 
non-digital information goods rarely last for more than one or two 
generations, digital goods can potentially last forever and each digital good 
purchased is likely to suppress the need for the descendants of the original 
consumer to purchase this good ever again.  
This potential infinite durability is a particular characteristic of digital 
goods and no other good in the economy, apart from information and land, is 
thought to have such a property. The advent of digital technology is 
therefore expected to have important consequences on the economy. 
The immediate expected effect of such durability is a progressive 
decrease of the demand. Indeed, the two main reasons that can cause 
consumers to purchase a particular cultural or information good more than 
once are:
-  deterioration of the medium (due to usage), 
-  change of technology.  
A damaged medium is, of course, the first reason that could lead to 
several purchases of the same recording. Vinyl discs and magnetic tape 
were known to be particularly fragile, and before the advent of digital era, 
this limitation would insure regular sales, since the copy of the recording to 
another medium (from a vinyl disc to an audio-tape for example) would result 
in a loss of quality. Beyond that, the medium technology is short-lived. When 
a new technology appears, consumers may have to buy the same good 
once again as no players compatible with the old technology are available 
anymore. For non-digital cultural and information goods such an issue 
cannot be resolved by transferring the good from the old medium to the new 
one, since it would result in a loss of quality. As the digital technology 
enables to create perfect copies of digital recordings, these two limitations of 
the durability do not exist anymore because it is always possible to make a 
backup copy of a recording before the medium gets damaged and because 
it is possible to transfer a recording on the next generation medium without 
loss of quality (music from a CD can be transferred onto a DVD). T. RAYNA  23 
Durability and loss of market power 
However, the consequences of durability of digital goods go far beyond a 
progressive decrease in demand. Indeed, as stated by Coase (1972), the 
sole fact that a good is durable may lead to a total loss of market power for 
the firms producing it. More precisely, COASE (1972) shows that even a 
monopolist producing a durable good will end up loosing all its market power 
due to the fact that consumers expect the monopolist to lower its price over 
time.
The reason for that is that the monopolist always has interest to gradually 
decrease the price in order to sell more  3 (as long as the price is above 
marginal cost, there is a residual demand that is a potential source of profit). 
Since the consumers are rational, they expect this decrease in price and 
delay their purchase until the price has fallen to the marginal cost. The only 
price at which the good can be sold is, thus, the competitive price, equal to 
the marginal cost (which corresponds to a total loss of market power), even 
when there is only a single firm supplying the good. 
Furthermore, the extent of the loss of market power depends negatively 
on the time lag between the periods of sales (COASE, 1972; STOKEY, 
1981; BULOW, 1982; THÉPOT, 1998): it is large if sales take place 
continuously and low if a large amount of time takes place between the 
periods of sales. One could add that if the good is really and urgently 
needed, it is unlikely that the loss of market power will arise. However, in the 
case of digital goods, it is quite likely it will, since none of these goods is 
usually a first necessity good nor have they many substitutes. Consumers 
can wait. 
The best known strategy to recover market power is to rent the good 
instead of selling it (COASE, 1972). A monopolist renting a durable good will 
see no interest in decreasing its price over time, since a decrease in price for 
new consumers necessarily means a decrease in price for all consumers 
(everybody pays the same rent  4). Consumers have, thus, no incentive to 
delay their purchase of the good and therefore accept to pay the monopoly 
3 This would not be the case for a non-durable goods as consumers renewing their purchase 
would then also expect a lower price. With a durable good, consumers never renew their 
purchase.
4 When the good is sold, a decrease in price for new consumers leaves unchanged the higher 
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rental price. Renting a durable good makes it equivalent to a non durable 
good that would last only the duration of a rental period.  
Unfortunately, such a strategy cannot be efficiently used as long as 
competition exists 5, which is particularly problematic, since the existence of 
(even potential) competitors also prevents reducing the negative effects of 
durability by spreading periods of sales (since competitors would find an 
advantage in staying continuously open). 
Another traditional solution is to make the durable good non-durable 
(BULOW, 1986; KARP, 1996). This type of strategy is usually referred to as 
"planned obsolescence" (BULOW, 1986) and can take two forms. Either the 
intrinsic durability of the good (its quality) is reduced (e.g. components of a 
TV set which are designed to fail a few days after the guarantee period 
expires), or a new substitute good with better features is produced and 
makes the previous durable good obsolete (e.g. Pentium processors made 
486 processors obsolete and was itself made obsolete by Core Duo 
processors).  
The economic impact of the durability of digital goods 
While far from being fully competitive, there is still a significant amount of 
competition in most sectors of the digital goods industry. This makes the 
fight against the negative effects of durability particularly difficult for firms. 
In spite of the theoretical inadequacy of renting strategies in such an 
environment, firms have nonetheless attempted to use renting strategies. 
While such strategies have encountered a relative success in the context of 
offline renting of some particular digital goods (Blockbuster has been, until 
recently, able to establish a quite profitable renting service of Video-DVDs), 
the advent of online trade of digital goods has considerably undermined the 
ability to rent digital goods.  
The reason for that is essentially technological. Renting out a digital good 
through the internet necessarily requires a copy of the digital good to be 
created on the computer (or similar device) of the consumer. Once the lease 
period is over, not only this copy, but also all the other copies the consumer 
5 BULOW (1986) and BUCOVETSKY & CHILTON (1986) show that a monopoly operating in a 
contestable market will better deter entry of competitors if it is selling. Likewise, PODDAR 
(2004) demonstrates that, within an oligopoly, selling is a dominant strategy. T. RAYNA  25 
might have made in the meantime have to be destroyed. The problem is that 
the digital technology itself does not permit that. This is the reason why 
Digital Rights Management Systems have been designed. Such systems 
encrypt digital goods in such a way that they cannot be consumed without 
authorisation. Hence, the problem of renting digital goods was expected to 
be solved, since after the lease expired, consumers would not be able to 
consume the (encrypted) copies made on their devices without obtaining the 
authorisation to do so and would have to pay to renew the lease in order to 
gain such authorisation. 
However, besides the issue that ways were found by consumers to 
circumvent all existing DRM systems (RAYNA & STRIUKOVA, 2008), such 
systems require a permanent connection between the devices used to 
consume the protected digital goods and the authorisation server. This 
makes DRM fit only for some digital goods (those consumed once and over 
a short period of time, such as films) and some devices (those permanently 
connected to the internet, such as computers, but not Digital Audio Players). 
While the rental of videos online is still at an early stage, online renting of 
music was introduced to the market some years ago. The companies that 
used such a strategies (Napster, Rhapsody, Yahoo) have been relatively 
unsuccessful. While this may be because of the renting strategies being 
inadequate when there is competition, the technological issues related to 
DRMs have also played an important role (RAYNA, 2006a). 
When renting cannot be used to reduce the negative effect of durability, 
planned obsolescence (either intrinsic or through substitutes) is often 
considered. However, in the case of digital goods, the intrinsic durability 
cannot be reduced (they are intangible) and reducing the durability of the 
medium or the technology is not effective, because of replicability.
Nonetheless, new substitute goods, making the old ones obsolete, can 
still be produced. Such a strategy is often used for software. New versions of 
software and operating systems are released, making the previous version 
obsolete and pushing consumers to renew their purchase. In this respect, as 
long as firms release new versions of software, the problems caused by 
durability do not arise. However, other digital goods, such as music, films or 
books cannot, as easily, be made obsolete.  
Although examples can be found of successful planned obsolescence 
used for such goods (for example, when CD versions of records previously 
available on vinyl discs were released) it is usually difficult to produce new 
versions of the same digital goods that would be improved enough for 26     No. 71, 3
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consumers to renew their purchase (for example, Audio-DVDs were a 
commercial failure). The reason for that technological progress has made 
the quality of digital goods very close to the limit of perception of humans, 
making any improvement marginal. Only the film industry has been able to 
release significantly improved versions of their products twice (from VHS to 
DVD and, more recently, from DVD to Blu-Ray). Nonetheless, although the 
difference of quality between a film in DVD format and the same film in Blu-
Ray format is significant, it is still quite arguable that more than a small 
proportion of consumers will repurchase films they already own. Besides, 
there will eventually be a point, as it is the case for other digital goods, when 
the existing quality of films will be such that any improvement will be 
imperceptible for most consumers. 
However, obsolescence is not necessarily solely due to the production of 
a new version of the same good, but can be caused by the production of a 
close enough substitute. In this respect, the impact of the production of a 
substitute essentially depends on the behaviour of the consumers, in other 
words on the degree of substitutability between goods. Digital films or books, 
for example, are seldom consumed repeatedly, despite their durability. In 
such a case, releasing new products might be enough to overcome the 
problems caused by durability and any new product may be considered as a 
close enough substitute. 
In contrast, other digital goods, such as music, are consumed repeatedly. 
In such a case, the definition of a close enough substitute depends strongly 
on the tastes of the consumers and, as such, is heterogeneous. For 
example, a die-hard devoted fan of Elvis Presley is only interested in 
recordings of Elvis, and the degree of substitution with recordings of another 
singer is likely to be low. As the number of records of Elvis, although large, is 
fixed, and, as there are no close substitutes, Elvis records are durable, since 
the demand for records of this consumer will decrease to zero after the 
consumer has achieved to purchase all the existing Elvis records. In 
contrast, a consumer who is a dedicated follower of fashion is likely to 
consider any new record as a substitute close enough to make the previous 
ones obsolete, since such consumer only consumes the latest hits. In this 
situation, the durability of a music recording is reduced, since it is not likely 
that this type of consumer will listen to a record older than a few months.  
Between these two extremes, given that the time consumers can devote 
to the listening of music is fixed, the impact of a new release will depend 
mostly on the "satiation factor", e.g. the time the consumers devote to old T. RAYNA  27 
and newly acquired records and on the difference of quality (or utility) 
between the newly released record and the previous ones. 
It is worthwhile noting that, in contrast to most other digital goods, such 
as movies and e-books, it is difficult to reduce the durability of music, since 
music records usually have a high satiation point and can be consumed over 
and over during years 6. Only consumers particularly fond of novelties may 
see music as a non-durable good. Thus, the common strategy consisting of 
introducing planned obsolescence in order to avoid the loss of market power 
associated with the selling of a durable good is not likely to be efficient in the 
case of music.  
If the durability of digital goods cannot be reduced, consumers are likely 
to expect a decrease in price and to defer their purchase. The public nature 
of digital goods tends to aggravate the problem, since consumers, while they 
wait for prices to drop are, nonetheless, able to consume illegal versions of 
the goods. Of course, this means that even if prices eventually decrease to a 
level they deem acceptable, they have little incentive to purchase something 
that they own (albeit illegally) already.  
Furthermore, even though firms selling digital goods have to 
progressively decrease their prices, they are usually able to obtain a high 
profit margin on the units of goods sold to impatient consumers who cannot 
wait for the prices to drop to the marginal cost. Because of the publicness of 
digital goods, even impatient consumers have few reasons to buy legally at 
a high price what they can obtain illegally at a low cost. Consequently, the 
remaining market power that firms retained on impatient consumers is likely 
to be completely absorbed by the publicness of digital goods, leaving firms 
no choice but to sell at marginal cost. 
  Digital goods are experience goods 
NELSON (1970, 1974) defines experience goods as goods whose 
qualities cannot be determined prior to purchase. KLEIN (1998) builds on 
this definition and states that there are two circumstances in which a good is 
considered an experience good: either when full information on the main 
6 Software also has a high satiation point and can be consumed over and over during years, 
but, as mentioned above, can be easily made obsolete. 28     No. 71, 3
rd Q. 2008 
attributes of the good cannot be known without direct experience, or when 
the search for information about the main attributes is more costly or difficult 
than experiencing the product directly. WRIGHT & LYNCH (1995) add to the 
literature by taking into consideration the fact that consumers are sometimes 
allowed to experience the product through free samples and, thus, define 
experience goods as goods whose qualities cannot be determined prior to 
consumption. 
Of course, it could be argued that most goods in the economy 
correspond to the above definition and are, thus, experience goods. 
However, the problems brought about by experience goods are most likely 
to arise when the good is durable (NELSON, 1970). For a non-durable good, 
over-estimating the value of the good is not an important issue, since it is 
only related to one or a few episodes of consumption (for this reason, a fruit 
is, usually, not considered as an experience good). However, this becomes 
critical when the good is durable, since over-estimating the value of the good 
is, then, related to a, potentially large, number of episodes of consumption.  
When one considers the goods that are supplied digitally, such as music, 
movies, software or books, it becomes obvious that most of them do indeed 
correspond to the above definition of experience goods. It is important, here, 
to differentiate the digital good from its content. While full information about 
the digital good, as a vector, is always available and unambiguous (e.g. the 
format used and its quality, such as MP3 128 kb/s), the information about 
the value of the content (e.g. how valuable the song embedded in the digital 
good is to the consumer) is often either unavailable or costly to retrieve. 
Regardless of the information the consumer may be able to obtain ex-ante
on the attributes of the content, the "true" value of a digital good, which 
mostly relies on the value of the content, is often realised ex-post.
Furthermore, the value of the content of some digital goods is so subjective 
that it is impossible for consumers to obtain full information on the attributes 
of the goods without experiencing them. This is typically the case of cultural 
goods such as music, movies, books, pictures, etc. In contrast, it may be 
possible for the consumers to obtain a sufficient amount of information on 
the main attributes of goods such as software, news, or technical reports, 
without experiencing them first. However, obtaining such information is likely 
to be much more costly than directly experiencing the product. Software 
suppliers often release demonstration versions of their products for this 
reason. 
In addition, the value of digital goods in not necessarily fully revealed 
after the initial episode of consumption, and some digital goods, such as T. RAYNA  29 
music, software or video games, generally need to be experienced several 
times before their true value becomes known to the consumer.  
However, in contrast to the two other properties of digital goods 
presented in the previous sections, it is important to note that the fact that 
digital goods are experience goods is not an intrinsic property of these 
goods, but is, instead related to their content. While all digital goods are, 
regardless of the content, public and durable, only a subset of these goods 
are experience goods. Yet, the content of digital goods, in general, is such 
that many of these goods are experience goods. 
Furthermore, since the main characteristic of an experience good is that 
its value cannot be determined prior to consumption, this definition can be 
extended to the goods for which it is possible to obtain full information about 
their attributes but the value obtained from these attribute remains unknown 
or uncertain. In such a case, durability plays a crucial role. While all the 
information about a particular product may be available, the fact that its 
product is durable makes it uneasy (or even impossible) to accurately 
determine its present value, since it corresponds to the discounted sum of 
the value obtained during each future episode of consumption.  
Therefore, all durable goods can be considered as experience goods, 
since the more a good is durable, the more it is likely to be regarded as an 
experience good by consumers. Since digital goods are infinitely durable, 
they can all be considered as experience goods, regardless of the nature of 
the content of the good itself. 
Understanding this characteristic of (most) digital goods is essential 
because experience goods have important effects on the economy. First of 
all, these goods create difficulties for consumers when making consumption 
choices and, as such, they tend to reward reputation and create inertia. 
Another consequence is that experience goods typically have lower price 
elasticity. In regard to the market structure, the presence of experience 
goods is likely to lead to a strong market concentration (NELSON, 1970).  
For firms, this characteristic of digital goods means that, depending on 
their ability to make consumers experience their products, they can either 
benefit from high switching costs or suffer from the switching costs of a more 
established competitor. For policy makers, the market concentration may 
lead to important market distortions and require public intervention (Microsoft 
Windows provides a good example of how an experience digital good can 
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However, even for firms that are talented (and/or lucky) enough to fall on 
the right side of the fence, the fact that digital goods are experience goods 
causes additional difficulties. As consumers are reluctant to purchase these 
goods before they are able to experience them and determine their value, 
firms have to supply consumers with samples of digital goods. If they do not 
do so, consumers may be encouraged to conduct their own sampling activity 
by pirating. This ‘illegal sampling' is made possible by another characteristic 
of digital goods: their publicness. Once this has happened, consumers are 
unlikely to pay for a legitimate version, even after the good has been fully 
experienced, since original and pirated copies are identical.  
Nonetheless, providing consumers with samples is not always an easy 
option. Indeed, firms need to ensure that consumers are only able to 
consume the sample a small number of times, as otherwise consumers' 
needs might be fulfilled by the sample, in which case they do not purchase 
the product. For some digital goods, it may be possible to offer, as a sample, 
a truncated/stripped down version of the digital good (as it is often the case 
with electronic books, films and software). Nevertheless, such a strategy 
may cause consumers to underestimate the value of the digital good, 
thereby reducing their willingness to pay. In addition, the value of some 
digital goods, such as music, is unlikely to be revealed by partial sampling, 
and may even require repeated experience.  
Durability, plays, here as well, an important role. Indeed, if pirated digital 
goods were not durable, pirating for sampling motives could have a positive 
effect on demand. In such a case, consumers would pirate a digital good in 
order to experience it and when the pirated good would wear down, they 
probably would be inclined to purchase the original, since they would have 
discovered its true value. Interestingly enough, in such a case, the equal 
quality between the original and the copy of the digital goods would, most 
likely, not be an issue for producers.  
  The new age of piracy 
Although it is true that piracy, in the form of copies of vinyl discs, audio 
and video tapes, photocopies of books, etc. has existed long before the 
advent of digital goods, the piracy of the pre-digital era was different and 
never reached the extent of digital piracy. The reason for this lies in the 
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Indeed, pirating a non-digital information good necessarily leads to the 
creation of a substitute good of lower quality. Therefore, during the analogue 
era, a pirated version of an information good was, at best, a good substitute 
of the original. Furthermore, as copies of copies were made, additional loss 
of quality or information occurred and after a few rounds of copying, the 
resulting pirated good would be a very poor substitute to the original. Thus, 
piracy could not spread infinitely, since each additional copy further 
decreased the quality.  
Successful piracy of an analogue good requires:  
-  an original or near original copy of the information good, otherwise the 
quality of the copy is too low;  
-  a direct copy between the original and the source: as each additional 
transfer to an alternate medium leads to a decrease in quality, it is not 
desirable to use any intermediate medium.  
This explains why the analogue era piracy was intrinsically restricted, 
while digital piracy is not. Non-digital piracy requires a large number of 
originals spread in the population, while digital piracy only requires one 
original. Furthermore, since any transfer of an analogue good leads to an 
additional loss of quality, direct contact is required in order for the piracy to 
take place. Finally, even in the best conditions, analogue piracy only leads to 
the creation of a substitute of the original, thereby restricting the extent of 
piracy, since the demand for substitute is likely to be lower than the demand 
for originals. 
The advent of digital technology has allowed piracy to develop to its full 
potential. First of all, any copy of a digital good is indistinguishable from the 
original. As a consequence, only one original needs to be sold for all 
consumers to be able to pirate: one original unit is sufficient to start a 
virtually infinite stream of absolutely identical copies. Secondly, since 
additional transfers of a digital good do not lead to any loss of quality, no 
direct contact between consumers is required for digital piracy to take place. 
As a result, even a rather isolated consumer is able to pirate the digital good 
through various intermediaries – such as phone lines (with modems), optical 
signals, wireless signals, etc. Finally, consumers are expected to be 
completely indifferent between the original and the copy as these are, due to 
the digital technology, perfect clones. 
To this respect, GANTZ & ROCHESTER (2005) relate that, when asked 
the difference between taping a song from the radio and copying it onto a 
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create more demand "since the quality [obtained] was not of the level of 
something [the consumer] would want to keep", while downloading music 
from the internet is not serving the music industry as a marketing vehicle. 
Quite on the contrary, the identical quality between the original digital good 
and its copy is often seen as the principal cause of the recent decline in 
records sales. 
Thus, what is new in the piracy of digital goods is not piracy itself, since 
this phenomenon is not new, but, rather, the fact that the technological 
constraints that had previously endogenously limited the extent of piracy, 
have disappeared with the advent of digital technology. Therefore, levels of 
digital piracy are expected to be extremely high, and this is indeed what 
recent figures show. 
  The value problem of digital goods 
The characteristics of digital goods exposed in the previous sections 
have a common effect: they all tend to decrease the price consumers are 
willing to pay for digital goods. The publicness and durability of these goods 
are both expected to lead to a price equal to marginal cost (i.e. the 
replicating cost), while the fact that digital goods are experience goods 
makes (usually risk adverse) consumers reluctant to pay the actual value of 
the good. 
In the case of digital goods, this pressure towards competitive price is an 
important issue for most of these goods are characterised by high (sunk) 
initial production costs that would not be recovered within a competitive 
environment. Thus, unless firms have a sufficient market power, they might 
not have enough incentives to produce new digital goods. From a social 
point of view, the issue of the production of digital goods is the traditional 
dilemma between underprovision and underutilisation (ARROW, 1962). 
For firms producing digital goods, though, the previous sections have 
demonstrated that the nature of digital goods makes it difficult to recover 
initial investment. It is not one, but three important characteristics of digital 
goods that threaten their profits. In this respect, piracy might well be the "tree 
that hides the forest" of multiple issues related to the production of digital 
goods. Indeed, even assuming that it were possible to totally prevent piracy, 
the infinite durability of digital goods would still undermine the profits of the 
digital goods industry. Furthermore, since sampling is one of the important T. RAYNA  33 
motives of piracy, it could be expected that without piracy, consumers would 
be even more reluctant to pay for digital goods they have not experienced. 
Furthermore, it is crucial for producers to understand how the different 
aspects of digital goods interact with each other. With regard to the public 
nature of a digital good, it is clear that it becomes stronger as time passes 
(more consumers owning an original or a copy means more potential 
sources). Producers would, thus, certainly want to concentrate most of their 
sales near the release date of the digital good. However, durability and the 
fact that digital goods are experience goods both lead, on the contrary, to 
consumers delaying their purchase.  
Similarly, although renting is a good way of addressing the issues caused 
by both durability and (lack of) experience, the success of such a strategy 
can be undermined by the public aspect of digital goods. Indeed, consumers 
might subscribe to an online music service, download all the songs they 
need, remove the anti-copy protection and cancel their subscription, thereby 
leaving the provider with an immense amount of royalties to pay and no 
income (RAYNA, 2006a). How can renting be successful if consumers are 
able to retain the good without paying the rent?  
In fact, it seems that the sharp decrease in reproduction and distribution 
costs producers have benefited from, because of digital technology, has 
been fully integrated by consumers, who are, thus, less inclined to pay a 
high price for digital goods. This phenomenon has certainly be exacerbated 
by the fact that consumers have taken an increasing part in the reproduction 
and diffusion of digital goods and are, now, an integral part of the production 
process (when a digital good is purchased online, the consumer bandwidth 
is used to distribute the good, the consumer processor is used to create the 
copy and the consumer hard drive to store the digital good). Regardless of 
the value perceived by consumers, how much is their willingness to pay for 
something that they may consider as having been essentially produced by 
them?
Although attempts have been made, with Digital Rights Management, to 
address all the issues caused by the nature of digital goods at once, these 
have been, so far unsuccessful (RAYNA & STRIUKOVA, 2008). In contrast, 
there are more and more examples of artists successfully using the nature of 
digital products to their advantage. Records are freely distributed and used 
to promote the purchase of tangible goods, such as concert tickets or 34     No. 71, 3
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merchandising, which are not subject to the same issues 7. Although such 
strategy cannot be universally applied to all digital goods, it shows that by 
understanding the nature of these goods and using it as a strength, instead 
of fighting against it, there may be some new and profitable ways to do 
business.  
Conclusion
Digital economy is at the same time promising (for companies, but also, 
in terms of growth, for governments and policy markers) and extremely 
challenging, since it forces to rethink the way goods are produced, 
distributed and sold. To fully apprehend (I think this should be 
"comprehend") the potential of digital economy and anticipate the coming 
challenges, it is of the utmost importance to consider, and understand, the 
particular economic nature of digital goods.  
As a matter of fact, digital goods are unlike any other good in the 
economy, in the sense that not only do they combine several particular 
characteristics, but also that these characteristics are, in their own way, 
extreme. Digital goods, like non-digital information goods, contain 
information, but also are themselves information. At the same time, digital 
goods are public, but unlike other public goods, their publicness varies and 
is a direct consequence of their non-rivalness. Furthermore, digital goods 
are infinitely durable, which is, in itself, rare, and are, due to this durability, 
experience goods. 
For both entrepreneurs and policy makers, the challenge is that only one 
of these characteristics would be sufficient to drive the price of digital goods 
to an unsustainable level and create a market failure. Yet, with digital goods, 
three sources of market failure are combined. Although it is true that some 
firms are able to gain large amounts of profit within the digital economy, it is 
crucial to understand that the characteristics of digital goods presented in 
this article are only likely to become even stronger due to technological 
progress. Thus, the challenges created by digital goods will only become 
greater. 
7 Income can also be derived from free downloads. When Radiohead offered their latest album 
online, letting downloaders free to choose how much to pay, the average price paid was $6, 
much more than the typical amount of royalties gained per album sale. T. RAYNA  35 
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